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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Federal Jurisdiction-Removal of Civil Rights Cases-Fourth Circuit
Affirms Limitations
Subsection 1443(1) of the Judicial Code1 permits removal to
the federal district court of a case commenced in a state court when
a defendant "cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right
under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens. .... -2
This provision has gained new importance because section 901 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits appellate review of a district
court order remanding such a case to the state court. Such review
was not previously available.
In Baines v. City of Danville,' the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed by a three-to-two decision
the remand of 105 civil rights cases, holding that the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment was not a "law providing
for the equal civil rights of citizens"4 and that the inability to en-
force the "law" must be shown to result from a state statute or
constitutional provision which, on its face, violates the provisions
of the federal constitution.5 The Fourth Circuit thus put itself in
conflict with holdings of the Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuits that
the equal protection clause was such a "law providing for the equal
civil rights of citizens"' and a further holding of the Fifth Circuit
-U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1964). For a more complete discussion of the
removal of civil rights cases and the origin, history and recent interpreta-
tions of § 1443 see Comment, 44 N.C.L. REv. 380 (1966). See also Amster-
dam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights:
Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court
Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 805 (1965).
'28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1964).
'357 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.), affirmed without opinion, 34 U.S.L. Week
3425 (June 21, 1966). The United States Supreme Court decision was an-
nounced after this note was written. The petitioners alleged that they
were being prosecuted for demonstrating in the streets of Danville in pro-
test against customs and practices perpetuating racial segregation, that the
injunctive order [which they were charged with violating] is unconstitu-
tional for "making criminal" conduct which is constitutionally protected [by
the first and fourteenth amendments] and that the injunction is in violation
of their civil rights. Id. at 758.
'Id. at 764.5Id. at 765.
' Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 347 F.2d 679, 682, rev'd, 34 U.S.L.
Week 4572 (June 21, 1966); New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255, 271
(2d Cir. 1965) (dictum); Steele v. Superior Court, 164 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1947) (dictum). The dissenting opinion in Baines relied upon these cases
for authority that the equal protection clause is a "law providing for equal
rights" within the meaning of the statute.
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that removal was justified in situations other than where the "law"
was rendered unenforceable by state statute or constitutional pro-
vision.7 The conflict is primarily one of statutory construction, and
this note will examine the opposing constructions as developed in
the majority and dissenting opinions in Baines.
I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In Baines the Fourth Circuit insisted that the petitioners' allega-
tions "that they were acting in aid of fourteenth amendment
rights . . ." furnished no basis for removal.' Section 1 of the
original civil rights removal act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
had enumerated rights which if denied made removal appropriate.
This law was re-enacted in 1870, and in the Revision of 1875 the
enumeration was taken out of the removal provision and placed
elsewhere in the Judicial Code.'" The court concluded that the re-
placement of the phrase "those rights enumerated in section 1"
with the language "all rights secured to him by any law providing
for the equal civil rights of citizens . . ." was not intended to extend
coverage in excess of those rights which had been previously enu-
merated in section 1, but that "the revisers understood that the
laws were not static and that the Congress in the future might
enact additional legislation . . . with an intention to expand the
removal rights."'" The statute was open-ended in that new laws
might come within its purview, but the fourteenth amendment was
not included for two reasons: it had been -passed by Congress and
ratified by the states in the period between the passage of the origi-
nal act and the re-enactment of 1870, and it was not a "law" in the
sense in which the word is used in the removal provision.'" The
court maintained the word "law" as used in the section refers only
to statutes providing for equal civil rights, and since the fourteenth
amendment is not a statute its inclusion was not intended.'3
A contrary conclusion in regard to the equal protection clause
was reached by the dissenting opinion. Also relying upon the scope
of the original removal act of 1866,14 it depended upon what it
"Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 347 F.2d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 1965).
' 357 F.2d at 764.
'Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
:oEv. STAT. § 641 (1875).
' 357 F.2d at 764.12 Id. at 763.
1 Id. at 764.
" 357 F.2d at 774.
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asserted was the "general understanding" of both the supporters
and opponents of the measure that the rights in section 1 were to
be given the broadest possible interpretation. 5 After the passage
of the original civil rights act, the dissenters observed, there was
some concern over its constitutionality, and the fourteenth amend-
ment, they concluded, was passed to insure the act's legality.
The enactment of the Equal Protection Clause, in language close-
ly paralleling section 1 of the 1866 statute, legitimated beyond
question Congress' attempt to protect the type of rights granted in
the statute, and there is no reason to think that the rights con-
templated by section 1 are of less breadth than those contem-
plated by the Equal Protection Clause.16
The dissenters thought that the adoption of the language
"'law[s] providing for equal civil rights' in the 1875 recodifica-
tion ...evidences the revisor's understanding of the broad view
taken by the 1866 Congress of the rights protected by removal"17
and that the section is thus not limited to "statutory" rights as the
majority contended.' s
The Supreme Court may decide whether the equal protec-
tion clause is a "law providing for equal civil rights" when ex-
amining the conflict between the circuit courts. 9 This determination
is not likely to increas6 or decrease removal litigation to any great
extent. Should it be decided that the clause is not such a law, a
petitioner can, without too much trouble, draft the removal petition
so as to base the claim upon a federal statute guaranteeing sub-
stantially the same substantive right.
II. WHAT PETITIONER MUST SHow To DEMONSTRATE
THAT HE CANNOT ENFORCE THE RIGHT
The early United States Supreme Court cases of Virginia v.
Rives20 and Kentucky v. Powers"' did not allow removal because
1 Ibid.
16 Id. at 775.
7 Id. at 777.
Ibid.
19 After this note was written the United States Supreme Court reversed
Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 34 U.S.L. Week 4572 (June 21, 1966), and
affirmed Rachel v. Georgia, 34 U.S.L. Week 4563 (June 21, 1966).
20 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
21201 U.S. 1 (1906). In both Rives and Powers the petitioners based
their right to remove on the allegation that a group to which they belonged
would be excluded from the jury that would try them in the state court.
The alleged exclusion, in each case, would not result from a state statute
but from a practice within the community.
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the petitioner could not satisfy the court that the protected right
would be denied in the state court.22 The Baines majority read
these cases as establishing the rule that a right must be denied by
a state statute or constitutional provision that is unconstitutional
on its face in order to remove to the federal court. It concluded,
furthermore, that the right to remove must be apparent before trial
and cannot be based "upon the supposition that during the course
of the trial or the sentencing, a protected right would be denied or
the defendant would find himself unable to enforce it."28 On the
other hand, the dissenting opinion maintained that the Rives-Powers
line of decisions has no application when removal is sought "on
assertions ... relating not to some future stage of the proceedings,
but to the very arrests and prosecutions which give rise to these
proceedings." 4 In this situation the Fifth Circuit had allowed re-
moval in Peacock v. City of Greenwood25 where the allegation was
that the arrests and prosecutions denied the petitioners "equal civil
rights,"28 that is, the right to demonstrate against the segregation
policies of the community.
The original act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, contained a pro-
vision for post-judgment removal which was deleted by the Revision
of 1875.27 The majority in Baines maintained that this rendered the
act virtually unenforceable.28 "[T] he judiciary cannot restore what
the Congress struck from the statute or construe what remains to
approximate the congressional intention 'before it struck the most
important part of its earlier scheme."2 The dissenting opinion did
not agree. It maintained that the purpose of the original act was
to provide for removal other than post-judgment removal and that
the excision of the post-judgment removal provision did not amount
to "major surgery" as the majority maintains.30
Another argument adopted by the majority opinion in Baines
is that there must be "vertical unenforceability,"' that is, the peti-
tioner must show that the right would also be denied in the state
22 100 U.S. at 320; 201 U.S. at 31.
2' 357 F.2d at 765.
Id. at 784.
347 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965) (removal allowed on facts almost identi-
cal to Baines).
Id. at 681.
REv. STAT. § 641 (1875).
28 357 F.2d at 768.
-1 Ibid.
80 Id. at 778.
81 Id. at 770.
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appellate courts. This argument was rejected by the dissenting
opinion, which insisted that even if this were true, when rights are
denied prior to trial by the arrests and prosecutions "vertical un-
enforceability" has no application and the question is mooted."
The dissent also relied upon the mood of the Thirty-ninth Con-
gress, which enacted the original Civil Rights Removal Act in 1866,
and the Eighty-ninth Congress, which enacted the provision for
appellate review in 1964. It maintained that the Eighty-ninth Con-
gress in providing for appellate review intended that federal courts
re-examine the restrictions on removal established by Rives and
Powers.3 But the majority disagreed, saying indications of this
were "minority expressions of an expectation of judicial reconsider-
ation of congressional intent ... not the equivalent of congressional
redefinition of its intention.""4
President Andrew Johnson, after once vetoing the original Civil
Rights Act of 1866, expressed concern over what he termed the
broad effect of the bill. In contrast, Senator Trumbell, the bill's
manager, in a speech to the Senate insisted that "there would be
no pretrial removal even in the face of a discriminatory state
statute. ' 35 The majority took Trumbell's remark to mean that Con-
"Id. at 787. The dissenting opinion points out that
after their removal petitions had been filed in the federal district court,
two of the present petitioners were tried in the Corporation Court of
Danville, fined, and sentenced to 45 to 90 days for their participation in
the demonstrations. The conduct of these two trials affords a striking
illustration of the treatment to be expected by these petitioners in the
state courts. Policemen were stationed at every corner of the room;
lawyers were searched on entering and leaving the courtroom; and
petitioners were required to appear in court from day to day for roll
call, although the prosecutor could have had no expectation of trying
more than a few of them on any one day. Thus any organized pro-
tests were effectively silenced and the defendants' ability to earn a
living impaired. Then, all the cases were transferred to various courts
throughout the state, some as far as 250 miles away.
The assumption that these Negroes' rights could be vindicated in
the state courts was dramatically undermined by a ruling that flatly
barred constitutional defenses to the charges against the demonstra-
tors. The presiding judge announced from the bench, prior to taking
of any evidence, that he would not permit any such defense to be
raised. By stripping appellants of any opportunity to show in the
record that their conduct was protected from state interference, this
prohibition shows a clear inability to enforce their rights in the local
tribunals.
Id. at 773-74.33 Id. at 788.
31 Id. at 762.
" CONG. GLonE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1759 (1866) [covering 1833-1873].
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gress never contemplated pretrial removal,"6 but the dissent main-
tained that the President was concerned only about the criminal
liability of the state court judges under the act 7 and that Senator
Trumbull was replying to Johnson in reference only to this aspect of
the statute. "The Senator did not say, as the majority would infer,
that these sections could not be brought into play by the action of
. . . sheriffs and policemen . . . prior to the court proceedings.""
Dissenting Judges Bell and Sobeloff would hold these cases re-
movable under subsection 1443 (1) if "they have been denied these
rights by state officials prior to trial .... -
Part of the reason for the wide divergence in the opinions can
be traced to the long period of time in which the problems remained
dormant because of the lack of appellate review and the futility of
attempting to reach conclusions about century-old congressional
mood or intent. There seems to be some merit to the argument
of the dissenters that the Eighty-ninth Congress meant for the fed-
eral courts to re-examine their position in regard to removal when
it passed the proviso for appellate review of an order to remand.
Whether or not this be the case, the conflict in the circuit courts
necessitates clear explanation of the Rives and Powers opinions by
a modern Court.
BILLY R. BARR
Securities Regulations-Civil Liability Under Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act and Rule 15cl-7 of the Exchange Act
In the expanding area of securities regulations, the Securities
Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 together
with the rules promulgated thereunder, have been used increasingly
as bases for finding civil liability for violations thereof. While
sections 11, 12(1), and 12(2) 3 of the Securities Act and sections
357 F.2d at 767.
, Section 2 of the original act of 1866, now 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964),
provided that any state official who "shall subject or cause to be subjected
any inhabitant ... to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by
this act.., shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
-8 357 F.2d at 783.
30 Id. at 773.
'48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bb (1964).
248 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1964).
'48 Stat. 82, 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1964).
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